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NOTE 

TAX LAW-THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND DIGRESSION FROM SEC­
TION 105(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health insurance and the benefits that it provides are extremely 
important to many people, I a fact that Congress has long recognized. 
The first Revenue Act, enacted in 1918, contained a provision allowing 
benefits received as compensation for injuries or sickness to be ex­
cluded from gross income.2 Although there have been major revisions 
to the Internal Revenue Code since 1918,3 this exclusion still exists, as 
does the purpose that motivated the original enactment, to provide 
some form of relief to those who must endure the misfortune of pain 
and suffering.4 
In response to problems concerning whether the source of the 
payments was a factor in qualifying for exclusion,!; Congress replaced 
section 22(b)(5)6 with section 105(c) in 1954.7 Thus, although the ex­
clusion privilege remains, the present exclusion statute, section 
1. D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 345 (1974). As of 1974, more than 180 
million Americans (nearly nine out of ten) possessed some form of accident or health 
insurance. 
2. 26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918). See infra note 11 for the text of this statute. 
3. "[T]he Internal Revenue Code mirrors the major economic, political, and social 
institutions dominating American life today." J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
7 (1968). Therefore, in an ever-changing society, the Internal Revenue Code must change 
in order to fulfill society's changing needs and expectations. 
4. For an analysis of Congress' intent underlying § 105(c), the current exclusion pro­
vision, see infra notes 15-24, 56-67, and accompanying text. 
5. During the 1940's and early 1950's, the exclusion's requirement that the payment 
had to come from an insured plan proved to be the source of a great deal of confusion. At 
one point, the IRS maintained that an "insured plan" was a plan underwritten by an 
outside insurance carrier, while at other times, it maintained that it was not necessary for 
the plan to be underwritten to qualify under the statute. For a detailed discussion of this 
controversy, see infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text. 
6. Section 22(b)(5) was not the first exclusion statute. Congress enacted the first ex­
clusion statute, § 213(b)(6), in 1918. However, in 1939, the Internal Revenue Code was 
recodified and § 22(b)(5) replaced § 213(b)(6), although the language of the statute essen­
tially remained the same. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
1. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c) (1982). 
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105(c),8 is distinguishable from its predecessors.9 Under section 
105(c), it is not sufficient simply to receive the benefits because of a 
permanent disability; instead, a number of requirements first must be 
satisfied in order to exclude disability benefits from gross income. 
While section 105(c) has solved the problems which existed prior to its 
enactment, new problems have developed. In certain cases, the Inter­
nal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts may be misconstruing the 
statute and disserving Congress' intent. 
This comment traces the development of this exclusion privilege 
from 1918 to the present, discussing in Section II the history of the 
statutes and their specific provisions, and in Section III and IV, dis­
cussing IRS and judicial interpretations of these statutes. Section IV 
also presents a recent case involving a claim for exclusion under sec­
tion 105(c) in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit applied an overly restrictive test and denied what this com­
ment argues was a legitimate exclusion. lO 
II. THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSION STATUTE 
A. Pre-1954 Developments 
From 1918 to 1954, section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 
1918 11 and then section 22(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
193912 governed the excludibility of accident and health benefits from 
8. Id. 
9. See supra note 6. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text for the text and 
discussion of the exclusion provisions which preceded § 105(c). 
10. Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 137-70 
and accompanying text. . 
11. 26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918) stated: 
That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in section 
233) the term "gross income" ­
(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation 
under this title: 
(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under work­
men's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus 
the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of 
such injuries or sickness. 
Id. 
12. 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982). The statute 
provided: 
SEC. 22 GROSS INCOME 
(b) EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME - The following items shall not be 
included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter: 
(5) COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS - Amounts received, 
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the taxpayer's gross income. Using identical language, 13 the statutes 
provided that payments from an ~ccident or health insurance plan that 
compensated for personal injuries or sickness would be excluded from 
the taxpayer's gross income .. 14 
The legislative purpose underlying the statute has remained con­
stant: to'provide some measure of relief to those who must endure the 
misfortune of pain and suffering. The exclusion is necessary because 
the Internal Revenue Code's definition of gross income is extremely 
broad. 15 Although insurance benefits are not enumerated as income in 
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as 
compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages 
received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness. 
Id. 
13. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) with 
26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918). See supra notes 11-12. 
14. Unfortunately, the requirement that the payments come from an insured plan 
proved to be the source of much controversy, prompting the enactment of § 105. See infra 
notes 25-45 and accompanying text. 
15. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1982) provides: 

GROSS INCOME DEFINED. 

(a) General Definition. - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income 
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the follow­
ing items: 
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items; 
(2) Gross income derived from business; 





(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; 
(9) Annuities; 

(to) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts; 

(11) Pensions; 
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; 
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income; 
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and 
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust. 
See also Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) ("The income taxed is 
described in sweeping terms and should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvi­
ous purpose to tax income comprehensively."); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 
(1940) (citation omitted) ("The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Con­
gress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories. Hence 
[the Supreme Court's] construction of the statute should be consonant with that pur­
pose."); Blassie v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Clifford, 309 
U.S. at 334) ("In our view the language of Section 61(a) defining 'gross income' in broadest 
terms manifests Congress' intention to exert the full measure of its taxing power over all 
realized gains."); Heard v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 1964) ("Gross in­
come is defined very broadly by § 22(a) of the 1939 Code and by § 61(a) of the 1954 Code, 
and includes all income from whatever source derived."), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) 
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section 61(a), the receipt of benefits from an accident or health insur­
ance plan arguably is an accession to wealth over which the disabled 
taxpayer has complete dominion and control and thus is income. I6 
Unless excluded by section 105(c), the taxpayer would have to include 
these benefits as gross income. 
Two factors motivated Congress to enact this exclusion: a feeling 
of pity and sorrow for the suffering taxpayer,I7 and a belief that com­
pensation for an injury essentially is a "return of capital" to the tax­
payer, which Congress traditionally has not taxed. IS 'With respect to 
the first element, the disabled taxpayer receives a payment only as a 
result of suffering a permanent, disabling injury. The purpose of the 
payment is to compensate the taxpayer for any pain and aggravation 
that he or she likely will be forced to endure for the duration of his or 
her life. Congress therefore chooses to exempt these payments from 
taxation "to avoid adding insult to injury."19 As the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Epmeier v. United States 20 stated, "The pro­
visions ... undoubtedly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has 
the misfortune to become ill or injured, of the necessity of paying in­
come tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages of 
(citations omitted); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 
1962) (citing Clifford, 309 U.S. at 334) ("Gross income is broadly defined by § 22(a) of the 
1939 Code and by § 61 (a) of the 1954 Code. . .. These and their corresponding predecessor 
statutes have been said to indicate the purpose of Congress to use 'the full measure, of its 
taxing power.' "); Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1962) ("The 
definition of income in the revenue statutes is very broad."); J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURA­
TION OF GROSS INCOME 3 (1967) ("[T]he meaning of 'gross income,' while eluding precise 
definition, has been said to be as broad as the word 'income' in the sixteenth amendment."); 
see generally R. DAILEY, ITEMS OF GROSS INCOME (1967). 
16. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme 
Court stated that "[i]nstances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over, 
which the taxpayer [has] complete dominion" are to be included in the taxpayer's gross 
income. Id. at 431. See also Moore v. United States, 412 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1969) 
("An economic. gain is includable in gross income when its recipient has such control over 
it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from it."). 
17. See generally Caplin v. United States, 718 F.2d 544 (2d' Cir. 1983); Schlenger, 
Disability Benefits Under Section 22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REV. 549, 550-52 (1954). 
18. See Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1918). The Court stated that "[i]n order to 
determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must 
withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that 
existed at the commencement of the period under consideration." Id. at' 185. See also 
Commissioner v. Pennroad Corp., 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955). Citing Doyle, the court 
held that petitioner receipt of a $15,000,000.00 settlement was tax-exempt because it repre­
sented a partial return of the $66,380,000.00 that petitioner was forced to expend due to 
defendant's fraud. Id. at 331-32. 
19. Caplin v. United States, 718 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Schlenger, 
supra note 17, at 552. 
20. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). 
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disease or accident."21 
The second factor which motivated Congress to enact the exclu­
sion is the notion that this type of compensation is a "return of capi­
tal" and thus not subject to taxation.22 Courts first applied this 
exclusionary theory to tort recoveries that were intended to make the 
plaintiff whole.23 Disability benefits are similar to tort recoveries; both 
seek to restore to the taxpayer something which has been taken away. 
Congress treated them in the same way, excluding both from gross 
income.24 From the statute's enactment in 1918 to its amendment in 
1954, courts and the IRS struggled to define the term "insurance or 
health plan. "2S Congress never defined explicitly what would qualify 
21. Id. at 511. This view is supported by Bertram Harnett's analysis of the purpose 
behind the privilege. He states: "The answer seems to lie . . . in the fundamental notion 
that the human body is not rea1lyproperty or capital [which] links with the feeling that the 
taxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more to 
be pitied rather than taxed." Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 614,627 (1952). 
22. See supra note 18. 
23. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927). Plaintiff received 
$112,000.00 in damages for defamation. The court ruled that the payment was not taxable 
because this type of compensation added nothing to the individual but simply attempted to 
put him in the same position that he was in before suffering the injury. Id. 
24. Income Tax-Proceeds of Accident Insurance Policy, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 
(1918). 
[T]he proceeds of an accident insurance policy are not "gains or profits and in­
come" as these terms are defined by the Supreme Court. Without affirming that 
the human body is in a technical sense the "capital" invested in an accident pol­
icy, in a broad, natural sense the proceeds ofthe policy do but substitute, so far as 
they go, capital which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take 
the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident. 
Id. at 308. See T.D. 2457, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) which agreed with the 
Attorney General's opinion and added that the amount of any damages received from a 
lawsuit or settlement also should be excluded from gross income. See generally Note, The 
Taxability ofPunitive Damages, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1052, 1055-64 (1953). 
See also H.R. REp. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1918). 
Under present law, it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or 
health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for 
personal injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or 
sickness are required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides 
that such amounts shall not be included in gross income. 
Id. 
25. 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982), stated: 
SEC. 22 GROSS INCOME 
p 
(b) EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME-The following items shall not be 
included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter: 
(5) COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS-Amounts received through 
accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen­
sation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received 
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness. 
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as "insurance," and a conflict arose as to what would satisfy the "in­
surance" requirement of the exclusion provision.26 The· basis of the 
conflict was whether the "insurance or health plan" had to be under­
written by an outside insurance carrier.27 This insurance issue became 
a major source of confusion in the late 1930's and early 1940's, when 
large-scale employers began instituting their own "in-house" health 
plans.28 Instead of paying large premiums to outside insurance carri­
ers for employee-disability coverage, companies would generate the 
necessary disability payments from their own· resources, a practice 
which proved to be more economically efficient from the employers' 
viewpoint.29 
These new in-house plans posed a problem for the IRS: did the 
statutory definition of "insurance" require an outside insurance car­
rier's financial support? The IRS vacillated for an entire decade, at 
one point holding that it did not,30 at other times holding that it did.31 
In 1943, the IRS stated that it would determine what constituted an 
insurance plan32 by examining various criteria on a case-by-case ba­
sis.33 Thus, an employer-insured plan that included the appropriate 
Id. (emphasis added). 
26. See Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952); LT. 4107, 1952-2 
C.B. 73; LT. 4000,1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015,1950-1 C.B. 23; LT. 4060,1951-2 C.B. 
11; Bureau of Internal Revenue News Release IR-53-047 (March 26, 1953), reprinted in 
[1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 116136. 
27. See I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 73; LT. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015, 1950­
1 C.B. 23; LT. 4060,1951-2 C.B. 11; Bureau ofIntemal Revenue News Release IR~53-047 
(March 26, 1953), reprinted in [1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 6136. See also 
Seligman, 1954 Code resolves many practical problems in taxation a/sickness. accident bene­
fits, 3 J. TAX'N 322, 330-31 (1955). 
28. See generally Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision a/the Internal Reve­
nue Code. 1953: Hearings on H.R. 8300 Be/ore the House 0/Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 364-73 (1953), reprinted in 3 INTERNAL REVENUE 
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE REVENUE ACT OF 1954 WITH LEGISLATIVE HISTO­
RIES AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS 364-73 (1982) (statement of Clifton W. Phelan, 
President, Michigan Bell Telephone Co.). Mr. Phelan stated that "in-house" plans were 
more attractive to large employers from a cost-benefit standpoint. He expressed dissatisfac­
tion with the discrimination in favor of insured plans, which further discriminate against 
those employees receiving benefits. To force companies with self-insured disability plans to 
buy commercial insurance would increase costs thereby increasing prices, creating an over­
all negative effect on the economy. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. I.T. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord LT. 4015, 1950-1 C.B. 23; I.T. 4060, 1951-2 
C.B. 11. 
31. I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 7~. See also B.LR. Release (March 26, 1953) 53-5 (CCH) 
Fed. Tax Serv., 11 6136. 
32. Gen. Couns. Mem. 23,511, C.B. 1943-1, 86. 
33. Id. In its ruling, the IRS suggested that determinative factors in its analysis 
would include employee contributions to the "plan" in question, enforceable rights and 
obligations of the employees, determinable benefits based on the degree of disability rather 
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elements would qualify as an "insured plan." After reaffirming its 
1943 interpretation in 1950 and 1951,34 the IRS ruled, in 1952, that an 
employer's self-insured plan could not qualify as "insurance" under 
section 22(b)(5) if the plan was not established under a contract with 
an insurance carrier.35 Benefits received under such a plan could not 
be excluded under section 22(b)(5).36 
In the face of this confusion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap­
peals, in 1952, issued the first judicial interpretation of the statutory 
term "insurance." In Epmeier v. United States,37 the court ruled that, 
even though there was no formal contract of insurance, payments 
made by an employer to an employee for disabilities would be eligible 
for exclusion.38 The court reasoned that the insurance requirement is 
satisfied if one party has assumed the duty and risk of compensating 
another should that other party suffer a 10ss,39 and that the statute 
does not require a formal, written insurance agreement.4O The Ep­
meier court stated that its decision was consistent with what Congress 
envisioned when it enacted this exclusion statute.41 
In 1953, confusion and uncertainty remained as to what would 
qualify as insurance under section 22(b)(5) of the 1939 Code. There 
were conflicting revenue rulings and an appeals court case holding 
that the insurance requirement could be satisfied when the employer 
did not have a written contract with an insurance ca~er.42 In an 
than on the length of service and amount of salary and whether a separate fund earmarked 
for such benefits existed. [d. at 88. 
34. I.T. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015, 1950-1 C.B. 23; I.T. 4060, 1951-2 
C.B. 11. 
35. I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 73, 74. 
36. [d. 
37. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). 
38. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 511. This view ultimately was endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81 (1957). The Court observed that "[b]roadly 
speaking, health insurance is an undertaking by one person for reasons satisfactory to him 
to indemnify another for losses caused by illness." [d. at 83. 
39. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 510. See also Herbkersman v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 
495 (S.D. Ohio 1955) (under a disability plan, risk of loss of income is transferred to the 
employer during periods of disability which makes in itself a contract of insurance); Haynes 
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 671, 674 (N.D. Ga. 1955) (employer becomes the insurer and 
benefits are paid only when the employee is iII), rev'd, 233 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 
353 U.S. 81 (1957). . 
40. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 510. 
41. [d. at 511. The court stated that "[t]he provisions of Section 22(b)(5) undoubt­
edly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become iII or injured, of 
the necessity of paying income tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages 
of disease or accident." [d. See supra text accompanying note 17.' 
42. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text. , 
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early example of non-acquiescence,43 the Commissioner of the IRS re­
fused to accept the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision as bind­
ing on the Service outside of the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction.44 The 
prognosis was for continued inconsistent rulings and increased 
confusion.4s 
43. Nonacquiescence by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service dates 
back to the Revenue Act of 1924 which created the Board of Tax Appeals. This Board was 
the predecessor to the Tax Court. Dwan,· Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions: 
Treasury Practice, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 593 (1946). Although the Commissioner is 
bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court, he or she must follow lower tax 
court rulings only with respect to the party involved in the particular suit and can disregard 
these rulings as precedent. Divine v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 152, 159 (1972). Thus, the 
Commissioner's nonacquiescence does not signal an appeal by the government; instead, it 
simply indicates that the IRS will maintain its original position on the issue, despite Tax 
Court and courts of appeals' rulings to the contrary. Carter, Commissioner's Nonacquies­
cence; A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 882 (1986). As a 
result of recent litigation, the Commissioner must release to the public internal documents 
used by the IRS to explain to IRS personnel its position on district court, United States 
Claims Court, United States Court of Appeals and Tax Court Memorandum decisions. 
Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981). These internal 
documents are called Action on Decisions. See Carter, supra, at 883 n.20. 
Some commentators have attacked the policy of nonacquiescence by the Commis­
sioner on the grounds that it is an encroachment upon the judiciary by the executive branch 
and, as such, violates the concept of separation of powers established in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonac­
quiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 595-604 (1985). See also Herzberg, Blueprint ofa Fair 
Tax Administration, 41 TAXES 161 (1963). Others have argued that the policy is violative 
of the principles of equity, see Rodgers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce", 59 NEB. 
L. REV. 1001, 1030-31 (1980), uniformity, see Comment, The Commissioner's Nonacquies­
cence, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 550, 553 (1967), and certainty, id. at 559. While commentators 
generally disapprove of nonacquiescence, it may be an appropriate response to certain 
problems, such as uncertainty of venue, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacqui­
escence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 604 (1985), subsequent intercircuit contlict, id. at 605, 
and a pending review by the Supreme Court, id. at 606. See also The Commissioner's 
nonacquiescences: their effect upon tax planning, 28 J. TAX'N 57 (1968); Note, Administra­
tive Law-Jurisdiction. Class Action. Injunctive Relief and Nonacquiescence-Lopez v. 
Heckler. 104 S. Ct. 221 (1984), 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 277 (1984) (providing an analysis 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' condemnation of Social Security Administration 
nonacquiescence). 
44. See Bureau of Internal Revenue News Release IR-53-047 (March 26, 1953), re­
printed in [1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 6136. The IRS argued that when Con­
gress enacted § 22(b)(5) in 1939, provision for compensation of permanent injuries was 
made by individuals purchasing policies from insurance companies with after-tax dollars. 
However, since 1939, employers have provided their own plans for employees. Therefore, 
"the Bureau deem[ed] that it was the intention of Congress that only payments which are 
truly 'insurance' payments should be excluded ... under section 22(b)(5) of the Code." [d. 
See supra note 43 for a discussion of the Commissioner's nonacquiescence. 
45. Seligman, supra note 27, at 332. The IRS' refusal to accept the Epmeier decision 
might have been justified if the IRS had a definitive policy which contradicted the decision. 
However, it did not. This is evidenced by the fact that Treasury Regulations III and 118, 
the official regulations that have interpreted the Code since 1942, contain no reference to 
§ 22(b)(5). Id. 
• • • 
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In 1954, therefore, during the major recodification ofthe Internal 
Revenue Code, the time was right for Congress to resolve the conflict 
surrounding the meaning of insurance under section 22(b)(5). 
B. Enactment '0/ Section I05-Post-1954 Developments 
Congress' original purpose in enacting section 105, in 1954, was 
to remedy the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the insur­
ance requirement contained in section 22(b)(5) of the 1939 Code.46 
However, Congress also added additional provisions in order to 
achieve another goal: to limit the exclusion privilege to the truly 
needy, disabled taxpayer who receives compensation because of injury 
or disease.47 
Section 105 states: 
AMOUNTS RECEIvim UNDER ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS 
(A) AMOUNTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER CONTRIBU­
TIONS.- Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts re­
ceived by an employee through accident or health insurance for 
personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the 
extent such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the em­
ployer which were not includible in the gross income of the em­
ployee, or (2) are paid by the employer. 
(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO ABSENCE FROM WORK.­
Gross income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) 
to the extent such amounts­
(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of use of 
a member or function of the body, or the permanent disfigurement, 
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section 
152), and 
(2) are computed with reference to the nature of the injury 
without regard to the period the employee is absent from work. 48 
Congress solved the "insurance" problem in a deceptively simple 
manner-by agreement and not by amendment. The language which 
proved to be the source of the pre-1954 confusion, "accident or health 
insurance" plan, remained unchanged. However, both the House49 
46. 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(S) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § lOS (1982). 
47. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
48. 26 U.S.C. § lOS (1982). Section (a) of the statute, therefore, states the rule that 
benefits received through an accident or health plan shall be included in the employee's 
gross income. Section (c) then provides the exception to this general rule, excluding perma­
nent disability payments that meet the requirements of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2). This 
comment concentrates specifically on section (c) of § lOS. 
49. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. lOS, reprinted in 19S4 U.S. CODE 
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and the Senate50 Committee Reports clearly reveal a congressional in­
tent that taxpayers should be able to exclude from their income, disa­
bility benefits financed by employers whether paid from insured or 
uninsured plans. In corresponding Treasury Regulation section 1.105­
5(a), the Treasury Department defined "accident or health insurance 
plan" in a manner similar to the definition expressed by the Epmeier 
court. 51 Therefore, in order to satisfy the section 105(a) "accident or 
health insurance" requirement, the taxpayer now must prove only that 
the employer has agreed to accept responsibility for certain employee 
expenses and has compensated the disabled employee for a permanent 
disability. 
In addition to resolving the insurance controversy, Congress ad­
ded several new requirements to section 105.52 For instance, the tax­
payer must prove that the payment is "for the permanent loss or loss 
of use of a member or function of the body,"53 and that the payment is 
"computed with reference to the nature of the injury" and not with 
reference to lost wages or salary. 54 These additional requirements fur­
ther the legitimate legislative purpose of preventing taxpayers from 
abusing the exclusion privilege and escaping taxation through an avail­
able loophole. 55 In the floor debate over section 105, Senator Morse 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4017, 4039 ("[The House] committee's bill grants equal tax treat­
ment to sickness and accident benefits, financed by employers whether paid under insured 
or noninsured plans, Such benefits are , , , excluded from tax if received as compensation 
for personal injury or sickness,"), Id, 
50, S, REP, No, 1622, 83d Cong" 2d Sess, 105, reprinted in 1954 U,S, CODE CONG, 
& ADMIN, NEWS 4621, 4645 ("[The Senate] committee approves in principle of the general 
objective of the House provision in equalizing the tax treatment of the insured and nonin­
sured sickness and accident benefits,"), See also Comment, The Legal Benchmarks of a 
Plan for Employees: A Navigational Framework Under Section 105, 8 LoY, L.A,L. REV, 
363, 365 (1975), 
51. 	 Treas, Reg, § 1.105-5(a) (1987) provides: 
In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the payment of 
amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries, , " An accident or health 
plan may be either insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be 
in writing or that the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable, 
Id, 
The Treasury seems to have adopted the reasoning of the court in Epmeier v, United 
States, 199 F,2d 508 (7th Cir, 1952), The Epmeier court stated that "[i]nsurance, of ancient 
origin, involves a contract, whereby, for an adequate consideration, one party undertakes to 
indemnify another against loss arising from certain specified contingencies or perils," Id, at 
509-10, See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
52, See Morris v, Commissioner, 52 T.C.M, (CCH) 1304, 1306 (1987) ("[P]etitioners 
have failed to place themselves within the statute because their payments were for services, 
not for anything else, including the loss of use of a member or function of the body,"), 
53, 	 26 U,S,C, § 105(c)(I) (1982), 
54, 	 26 U,S,C, § 105(c)(2) (1982), 
55, 	 A "loophole" to escape taxation would be available if taxpayers simply catego­
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made the point sharply: "Limitations are wise because it is my under­
standing that in the past, corporation executives and other high-sala­
ried employees have been able to draw the amounts of their regular 
salaries as tax-exempt 'disability' benefits from special plans while on 
extended vacations taken on 'doctor's orders.' "56 
Added by the Senate Finance Committee57 and accepted by the 
House,58 these new requirements are codified in section 1 05( c). 59 The 
first requirement specifies that the amount received must constitute 
payment for a permanent disability.60 According to Treasury Regula~ 
tion section 1.105-3, the Treasury defines "permanent" as that which 
"may reasonably be expected to continue for the life of the 
individual."61 
Disability is defined by statute as "loss or loss of use of a member 
or function of the body. "62 While the Treasury gives examples <:>f what 
constitutes a "loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body" 
in Treasury Regulation section 1.105-3,63 this regulation is general and 
open-ended.64 Because of this, the meaning of "loss of use of a mem­
ber or function of the body" is still litigated, as a later section of this 
note documents. 65 
The second major restriction, added in 1954, requires the pay­
ments to be "computed with reference to the nature of the injury with­
out regard to the period that the employee has been absent from 
work."66 This requirement prevents the taxpayer from doing what 
rized pension plan funds or sick-day credits as disability payments upon receipt. However, 
such a "loophole" is eliminated by the various requirements imposed by Congress through 
§ 105(c), the courts, and the IRS. 
56. 100 CONGo REC. 9,323 (June 30, 1954) (statement of Sen. Morse). 
57. S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4623. 
58. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5280, 5284. 
59. For the language of section 105(c), see supra text accompanying note 48. 
60. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982). 
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987). 
62. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987) which states: 
For purposes of section 105(c), loss or loss of use of a member or function of the 
body includes the loss or loss of use of an appendage of the body, the loss of an 
eye, the loss of substantially all of the vision of an eye, and the loss of substan­
tially all of the hearing in one or both ears. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
63. Id. 
64. By the use of the word "include" in Treasury Regulation § 1.105-3, the IRS 
intended the examples provided to be illustrative rather than all-inclusive. 
65. See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text. 
66. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982). 
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Senator Morse feared: disguising wages or deferred compensation as 
disability benefits and, undeservedly, obtaining the exclusion privilege 
of section 105.67 
Thus, the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding section 22(b)(5) 
of the 1939 Code was eliminated, not by altering the language which 
was the source of the confusion, but by means of the legislative history 
in which Congress expressed its wish to have uniform treatment of 
accident and health insurance plans. 
In addition, Congress, through section 1 05( c), included certain 
requirements which the taxpayer must meet in order to exclude bene­
fits from gross income. These requirements express Congress' desire 
that only those who suffer permanent disabilities should be able to use 
the exclusion. Since 1954, the courts and the IRS, at times, have inter­
preted these requirements to legitimately effectuate Congress' intent. 
However, there have been instances where the courts and the IRS 
overstepped the boundaries which Congress created in 1954. 
III. JUDICIAL AND IRS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 105­
STANDARD ApPLICATIONS 

While the statute has remained unchanged since its enactment in 
1954, its interpretation by the IRS and the courts has been ever-chang­
ing. The following subsections review IRS and judicial applications of 
section 105(c)'s plan and permanent loss requirements. The cases 
presented in this section exemplify proper and legitimate interpreta­
tions of the congressional intent underlying section 105(c). However, 
as illustrated by Hines v. Commissioner,68 there still exists the danger 
of applying an approach which exceeds the bounds of judicial discre­
tion defined by Congress when it enacted section 105(c). Section IV of 
this note presents a recent Ninth Circuit case in which the court of 
appeals applied the statutory requirements in an overly restrictive 
manner.69 
A. Caplin v. United States-HA Plan" 
In Caplin v. United States,70 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit developed an approach for determining when 
an accident or health insurance plan exists for purposes of section 
67. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
68. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text. 
69. Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). For a detailed discus­
sion of this case, see infra notes 137-70 and accompanying text. . 
70. 718 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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105(c). In Caplin, a person employed by the same company for thirty­
eight years71 was forced to retire due to severe neurofibroma-"a neu­
rological impairment causing the loss of use of the limbs."72 At the 
time of his forced retirement, petitioner received $305,815.97, the total 
amount in his account in his employer's profit-sharing plan.73 Peti­
tioner reported the payment as income on his return and then filed a 
claim for a refund which the IRS denied.74 On appeal, the petitioner 
contended that his employer's profit-sharing plan served a "dual-pur­
pose" of a profit-sharing plan and an accident or health insurance 
plan.75 
The Caplin court noted that there is a significant difference be­
tween a profit-sharing plan and an accident or health insurance plan.76 
The court stated that simply "changing the labels attached to the pay­
ments at the time the payments are made" was not enough to fulfill 
the requirements for the exclusion of income under section 105( c). 77 
Profit-sharing plans are to reward employees, and the amount in each 
account depends solely on the financial success of the company and 
the individual employee's position within the company. Alternatively, 
accident and health plans protect employees and their beneficiaries78 
from accident and health risks.79 Regardless of the fortunes of the 
company or the employee's "rank" within the company, benefits for 
disability compensation always will be available. 80 
Referring to the structure of section 105, the Caplin court noted 
that the threshold question, prior to addressing any section 105(c) is­
sues, is whether a "plan" exists.81 Acknowledging that Treasury Reg­
ulation section 1.105-5 is general and allows virtually everything to 
71. Id. at 545. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 547. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 548. 
77. Id. 
78. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 203 (3d ed. 1976) de­
fines "beneficiary" as "the person named (as in an insurance or annuity policy) as the one 
who is to receive proceeds or benefits accruing." Id. 
79. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 548. 
80. Presumably in recognition of these and other differences, Congress has enacted 
an entirely different section pertaining to profit-sharing plans. See 26 U.S.C. § 402 (1982). 
81. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 547. 26 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts received by an employee 
through an accident or health insurance plan for personal injuries or sickness 
shall be included in gross income to the extent such amounts (I) are attributable 
to contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of 
the employee, or (2) are paid by the employer. 
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qualify as an accident or health plan,82 the court decided to formulate 
its own guidelines to determine whether a plan actually is an accident 
or health plan for purposes of section 105.83 
In searching for the plan's true purpose,84 the Caplin court 
looked for the following general indicia: (1) a preamble to the plan 
which states that its purpose is to qualify as an accident or health 
plan;8s (2) an announcement that the benefits payable under the plan 
are eligible for tax exclusion;86 (3) a statement that the plan will reim­
burse the employee for certain medical expenses incurred;87 and (4) a 
schedule listing pre-determined amounts of compensation for specific 
injuries incurred, such as loss of a leg or an arm.88 While the court 
emphasized that including these provisions in a plan does not guaran­
tee that it qualifies as an accident or he~lth plan, their absence "plainly 
militates" against finding that the plan in question serves as an acci­
dent or health plan.89 In Caplin, the court held that the benefits re­
ceived by the petitioner were not eligible for exclusion under section 
105(c) because the indicia were not presen~, and, therefore, the plan 
failed to qualify as an accident or health insurance plan.9O Instead, the 
plan resembled a profit-sharing plan for employees of the company.91 
Both the holding and the reasoning of the Caplin court faithfully 
serve the intent of Congress in enacting section 105.92 Its judicial 
Id. See also American Foundry v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); Kaufman v. Commissioner, 300 
F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13,1987); Comment, Taxation of 
Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222, 
231 (1954) ("[I]f an arrangement fails to constitute a 'plan for employees,' the exemptions 
granted by ... [Section] 105 will be lost unless the arrangement independently qualifi:es as 
'insurance.' ") Id. (citation omitted). 
82. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See also American Foundry, 536 F.2d at 293. 
83. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text. 
84. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See also Sidman v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 474 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court stated that, "[a]t the least, a 'plan' must contain the general 
indicia of insurance - that is, a contract by which one party undertakes to indemnify 
another against loss arising from an unknown or contingent event." Id. at 476 (citation 
omitted). 







92. The Caplin court is not the only court to faithfully adhere to the congressional 
intent underlying § 105 and question whether the plan which generated the payments is 
truly an accident or health insurance plan. See American Foundry v. Commissioner, 536 
F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1976); Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); Kaufman 
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skepticism reflects well-grounded congressional concerns. Many plans 
are not accident or health plans but suddenly transform into such 
when the taxpayer attempts. to exclude payments under section 
105(c).93 To "rubber-stamp" all payments made after a disability 
would open the door to substantial abuse of the privilege. Significant 
dividends or deferred compensation could be transferred tax-free in 
the form of putative health or disability benefits,94 which Congress did 
not intend when it enacted section 105(c).95 
. The Caplin decision created what appropriately is known as the 
"Caplin analysis," which courts and the IRS now employ in determin­
ing what qualifies as an accident' or health plan.96 This analysis is 
v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962); Bogene, Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 730 (1968); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13, 1987). 
93. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 548. 
94. American Foundry, 536 F.2d at 293. .' 
95. See S; REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4621,4645; see also Hines V. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 715, 718-19 
(1979) ("The intent was to provide a tax benefit to one who receives a severe physical injury 
which permanently and significantly lessens the quality of life which he had enjoyed prior 
to the injury."). . . 
Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a) (1987) states ~hat the plan does not have to be transcribed but 
also can be oral. With this in mind, and the fact that the "Caplin analysis" and its exami­
nation of various indicia can be applied only to written plans, there also are requirements 
for the informal, unwritten plan. Essentially, courts will search for an established practice 
or custom within the business which has the effect of a plan. For instance, the court may 
examine whether it is stated in the corporate minutes, Bogene, Inc. V. Commissioner, 27 
T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 7~3 (1968), whether the employee knew of the plan's existence before 
payments were made, Greer V. Commissioner, 70 T.e. 294 (1978), or whether it has been 
the employer's practice in the past to pay employees who incur serious injuries or disabili­
ties, Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, 35 T.e. 663 (1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 
1962); see also Greer, 70 T.C. at 301 (because the use of corporate aircraft for medical 
reasons was available to all employees of the corporation and requests for such use never 
had been denied, "a 'policy or custom' existed which had the effect of [a] plan.") [d. Ab­
sent such instances, the courts are extremely reluctant to find that there is a plan. See 
Larkin V. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968). 
96. See supra note 95. See Rosen v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 97 (W.O. Va. 1986), 
rev'd, 829 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.1987). In Rosen, the petitioner was employed as an executive 
for Warner Communications, Inc. Shortly after commencing work with Warner, the tax­
payer suffered a horse-riding accident, resulting in serious physical and neurological dam­
age that prevented him from ever returning to work. [d. at 508. His employment contract 
with Warner contained a specific provision outlining the terms of benefits that the peti­
tioner would receive in the circumstance of permanent injuries and inability to function in 
an executive capacity with the company. [d. Due to the severity of his injuries, the peti­
tioner qualified for payments under the provision and received payments of $282,550.00 in 
1977 and $183,691.44 in 1978. Rosen, 646 F. Supp. at 98. The petitioner paid taxes on 
these amounts and then filed a claim for a refund, maintaining that the payments were 
excludible under § 105(c). The IRS denied the refund claim and the taxpayer brought suit 
in district court. Rosen, 829 F.2d at 508. The district court ruled that the compensation 
received by the petitioner qualified for exclusion under § 105, stating that the § 105 deter­
mination rests upon the actual disability incurred and not upon the terms of the underlying 
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fairly simple for the IRS to apply and for the taxpayer and employer 
to satisfy. The plan must state that it serves as an accident and health 
plan,97 that the benefits are excludible from gross income,98 that medi­
cal expenses related to the injury are covered by the plan,99 and that 
an accompanying schedule relates payments to the nature of the in­
jury.lOO These "indicators" are clear, easy to follow, and faithful to 
the congressional purpose. 101 
B. Hines v. Commissioner-"Function of the Body" 
Section 105 (c)(l) requires that the payment from a qualified plan 
must be for the "permanent loss or loss of use of a member or function 
of the body."102 Although the ','permanent loss or loss of use of ,a 
plan. Rosen, 646 F. Supp. at 99. In the view of the district court, where the triggering event 
leading to the distribution of benefits is a permanent disability, the entire distribution is 
eligible for exclusion under § 105, regardless ofthe terms of the underlying plan. Id. at 100. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the lower court's analysis 
"generally ignored the significance of the governing agreement in determining 'whether pay­
ments were excludible under section 105(c)." Rosen, 829 F.2d at 509. While admitting 
that the permanency of the disability must be considered, the court emphasized that this 
was not the determinative factor. Instead, reaffirming Caplin, the court held that the plan 
requirement that the payment come from an accident or health insurance plan first must be 
satisfied. Id. The court of appeals concluded that the petitioner's plan failed to satisfy this 
requirement in several ways. First, the contract provided benefits only if the employee was 
absent from work for a six-month period. Id. at 510. It contained no requisite that the 
injury be permanent, and it failed to contain a schedule of payments which would reflect 
the nature of the injury. Id. Thus, although the payments were for the permanent injuries 
suffered by the petitioner, they were not excludible under § 105(c) because they did not 
come from an accident or health plan. 
See a/so Gordon v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 630 (1987). Relying upon the analysis 
established in Caplin, the Tax Court denied the petitioner's claim because the profit-sharing 
plan in question failed to include any of the indicia qualifying it as a dual-purpose plan. Id. 
at 638-40. See a/so Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13, 1987). Applying the "Caplin analy­
sis," the IRS refused to allow a § 105( c) exclusion 6f benefits because the plan failed to state 
a goal to provide health care and security for employees and failed to provide specific com­
pensation for certain injuries. Further, the employee's absence from work also was arequi­
site to receiving payments. Therefore, the IRS determined that the plan was not a dual­
purpose plan, and the benefits generated from it could not be excluded from gross income. 
Id. 




101. As stated in Caplin, inclusion of these various indicia by no means automati­
cally qualifies the plan's benefits for e~clusion.. However, the absence of these indicia is a 
clear signal to the court that an appropriate plan does not in fact exist. Id. 
102. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982); see Laverty v. Commissiorier, 61 T.C. 160 (1973). 
The " 'loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body' must be the cause of the 
payment." Id. at 167 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 105 (c)(1) (1982». 
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member" is well understood,103 the meaning of loss of use of a "func­
tion of the body" is less clear. Given the lack of a statutory defini­
tion,l04 an unhelpful legislative history, lOS and an inadequate Treasury 
Regulation,106 the IRS and the courts have defined "loss of function" 
on a case-by-case basis. 107 The test which has evolved from these deci­
sions is questionable, leading one to inquire whether there can be a 
viable definition for "loss of body function." 
In Revenue Ruling 63-181,108 petitioner, terminally ill with can­
cer, was forced to retire and received disability benefits. 100 Relying on 
competent medical authority, the IRS permitted him to exclude these 
benefits because his disease resulted in the complete loss of all bodily 
functions. 110 The IRS noted that when determining whether pay­
ments qualify for exclusion, all of the facts and circumstances of each 
case must be considered. Ill As later court decisions show, however, 
expert medical opinion proving loss of body function is, in and of it­
self, insufficient to satisfy section 105(c)(I).1l2 The taxpayer also must 
prove that the lost "function" was a significant one, upon which he or 
she heavily relied. In Hines v. Commissioner,l13 a commercial airline 
pilot suffered a heart attack and consequently his commercial pilot's 
103. BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 887 (5th ed. 1979) defines "member" as "[a] part 
or organ of the body; especially a limb or other separate part." Id. See California Casualty 
Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 13 Cal. 2d 529, 531-33, 90 P.2d 289, 
290-91 (1939) (court held that eye-glasses were not artificial "members" of the body and, 
therefore, injury to them is not compensable under workmen's compensation acts). 
104. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982). 
105. See supra notes 49-50, 56-58 and accompanying text. 
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987) states: 

For purposes of section 105(c), loss or loss of use of a member or function of the 

body includes the loss or loss of use of an appendage of the body, the loss of an 

eye, the loss of substantially all of the vision of an eye, and the loss of substan­

tially all of the hearing in one or both ears. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
107. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hether the 
section 105(c) exemption applies to payments received by an employee depends upon all the 
facts and circumstances in each case."). Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74, 75). 
108. Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. The medical expert consulted in this particular case stated that petitioner'S 
cancer gave him a life expectancy of only a few months and was so acute that it rendered 
him totally disabled. Id. at 74-76. 
11 I. Id. at 75. 
112. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983). In Watts, the peti­
tioner submitted an affidavit of his personal physician stating that his "loss" constituted a 
loss of body function. The court ruled this was insufficient and that petitioner must estab­
lish a permanent loss of body function. Id. at 352-53. See also Hines v. Commissioner, 72 
T.C. 715 (1979). See infra notes 117-34. 
113. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). 
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license was revoked. 114 The petitioner received benefits from his em­
ployer's disability plan l15 which he attempted to exclude from his 
gross income under section 105(c).116 To show that the payment was 
for the "permanent loss ... of a function of the body," petitioner 
presented expert medical opinion that his heart attack destroyed mus­
cle tissue and that part of the heart's function was lost permanently. 117 
The Tax Court denied his claim stating that Hines' liberal (and literal) 
interpretation of the word "function" would "circumvent the purpose 
of the statute,"118 which is to provide some form of relief to the person 
who suffers a serious physical injury which significantly affects the 
quality of life enjoyed prior to the injury.119 
In adopting a restrictive definition of "loss of body function," the 
IRS and the courts distinguish between loss of body function and loss 
of work function. It is not enough for the taxpayer to establish a per­
manent loss of body function. Instead, he or she also must show an 
inability to perform in the same capacity as prior to the injury, and 
that it is an injury which is serious enough to affect his or her lifestyle 
adversely.120 As one court stated, "[i]t is quite possible for one to lose 
the capacity to function in a particular work setting without one's 
body losing the capacity to function in some manner."121 The Hines 
court emphasized the fact that the petitioner continued to live a nor­
mal Hfe, 122 and simply because he could not continue as a commercial 
airline pilot did not mean. that he could not engage in other gainful 
activity. 123 
114. J.d. at 716. "[Federal Aviation Administration] regulations permanently dis­
qualify an individual for the position of pilot if he has a history of heart attack, irrespective 
of the degree of recovery and subsequent freedom·from symptoms." Id. 
115. Id. To be eligible for benefits under the employer's disability plan, a pilot mem­
ber must be incapacitated for fourteen consecutive months. An incapacitated member was 
defined in the plan as having a physical or mental disability or condition such that he was 
unable to hold an FAA medical certificate needed to serve in the capacity and status in 
which he was serving at the time of the incapacity. Id. 
116. Id. at 716. 
117. Id. Petitioner's personal physician also stated that petitioner was highly suscep­
tible to another, more severely disabling heart attack. Id. 
118. Id. at 719. 
119. Id. at 718-19. 
120. Id. at 719. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
121. Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 352 (9th Cir. 1983). 
122. Hines, 72 T.C. at 719. 
123. Id. at 720. See also Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983), in 
which the petitioner was forced to retire from his job due to high blood pressure and exces­
sive hypertension, and then attempted to exclude the benefits that he received at his retire-, 
ment. The court rejected his claim stating that he may have lost that particular work 
function but he still was able to engage in other work where the pressure would not be so 
great and the petitioner's symptoms would not be aggravated. Id. at 351-52. 
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In an attempt to formulate a test to determine what qualifies as a 
"function of the body," judicial and IRS decisions124 are consistent 
with the congressional intent underlying section 105; all have a restric­
tive interpretation which prevents those suffering a minor injury from 
benefiting from a privilege reserved for those suffering serious physical 
injuries. 12S However, this analysis is inconsistent with Congress' in­
tent when it enacted the original exclusion statute, section 213(b)(6) in 
1918,126 to provide some form of relief to those who experience pain 
and suffering as a result of sustaining permanent injuries. 127 The re­
sult is that this particular "function" test is unpredictable and, at 
times, may be violative of congressional intent. 
The "function" test established by the Tax Court in Hines is 
proper in that it will preclude the taxpayer with the very minor injury 
from escaping taxation through a loophole. For example, a person 
who loses her small toe in an accident is still capable of walking and 
running and is not hindered in any significant way. Section 105(c) was 
not intended to provide for her. However, the test disserves the origi­
nal purpose of the statute by preventing a taxpayer with a more signifi­
cant injury from excluding disability benefits from gross income. In 
Hines, the court denied the petitioner's claim because the loss of mus­
cle tissue did not adversely affect his lifestyle, and he still possessed the 
ability to pursue gainful employment in some other area. 128 Granted, 
Hines is able to pursue other employment, but the additional require­
ment that the loss must "adversely affect" the taxpayer's lifestyle is 
inconsistent with the interpretative scheme which Congress envisioned 
when it enacted the first exclusion statute in 1918. Congress added 
these requirements in 1954 to restrict the use of section 105 for pur­
poses of preserving it. Yet, to interpret these new requirements to 
mean that the injured taxpayer's lifestyle must be adversely affected in 
order to exclude disability benefits from gross income restricts the use 
of section 105 far beyond what Congress had intended. If the Hines 
court was somehow fearful of potential abuse of the exclusion privi­
124. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983); Hines v. Commis­
sioner, 72 T.C. 715 (1979); Berner v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 88,468; 
Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74. 
125. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
128. Hines, 72 T.C. at 719-20; see also Watts, 703 F.2d at 352. ("It is quite possible 
for one to lose the capacity to function in a particular setting without one's body losing the 
capacity to function in some manner. The terms 'work' and 'body' simply are not synony­
mous-they have different definitions."). 
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lege, the requirements added by Congress in 1954 ensure that taxpay­
ers cannot take unfair advantage of section 105( c). 
In Hines, subsequent to his attack, the petitioner was no longer 
eligible to be licensed as a commercial airline pilot. 129 The Tax Court 
stated that the petitioner's loss was minor and that he could continue 
to live a normal life and pursue other means of employment, conclud­
ing that the loss would not have an adverse effect upon his lifestyle. 130 
Yet, in a profession such as his, there is a significant chance that such 
a loss would have an adverse effect upon his lifestyle. For purposes of 
showing the approach's fallibility, assume that Hines' annual salary as 
an airline pilot was $120,000.00. Unable to pilot again, he is now re­
quired to search for new employment. Based on his previous work 
experience, he might be qualified for the position of cargo dispatcher 
which may pay an annual salary of $30,000.00. Undoubtedly, to be 
forced into such a position would have a serious effect upon the life­
style which the taxpayer previously enjoyed, forcing him to adapt to 
an entirely new lifestyle due to a significant decrease in income. 
As another example, consider the case of a surgeon specializing in 
a field requiring a significant amount of training and expertise. If the 
surgeon suffered some type of permanent nerve damage to her hands, 
depriving her of only a slight degree of manual dexterity, she likely 
would be forced to retire from surgery. Under the Hines approach, 
she could not exclude the disability benefits received under an accident 
or health plan because the injury would be deemed comparatively mi­
nor and the physician would be able to operate a diagnostic medical 
practice. From the physician's standpoint, however, the relatively mi­
nor loss of nerve function is absolutely devastating, signifying the loss 
of a skill which took years to acquire and master, forcing retirement 
from one's chosen work, and causing a significant loss of future in­
come. Therefore, injuries which may appear minor to a court apply­
ing the Hines test may be major injuries to the taxpayer, the person 
section 105 is intended to serve. 
The inequitable consequences which may result from applying 
the Hines approach exemplify the difficulties of formulating an ap­
proach which consistently can be true to both the general purpose of 
the exclusion privilege, to provide for those who suffer a permanent 
disability, and the specific purpose of section 1 05( c), to restrict the use 
of the exclusion and to preserve it for those whom it was intended to 
serve. The Hines approach will be true to the specific purpose in every 
129. Hines, 72 T.e. at 716. 
130. Id. at 719-20. 
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instance because it will effectively weed out fraudulent claims. How­
ever, in certain instances, the Hines court's myopic view of what con­
stitutes an injury adverse to one's lifestyle may prevent the fair 
application of section l05(c) to disability benefits. Hence, the courts 
may violate the general purpose by preventing a taxpayer who is ex­
periencing pain and suffering from excluding from gross income any 
disability benefits that he or she receives. 
Although the holding in Hines may be incorrect, the approach 
which the Hines court formulated is a step in the right direction. The 
goal is to build from this approach and to formulate an analysis which 
can serve both purposes of section 105 in every instance. Considering 
the individual factors involved in each case, it appears that a uniform 
"function of the body" test would be impossible to effectuate, because 
it would discriminate against some claimants with legitimate injuries. 
Thus, the solution to the problem is to analyze each of these individual 
factors carefully, a solution that will consume both time and money 
but which is necessary to administer section 105 properly. 
C. 	 Section 105(c)(2)-"Computed With Reference to the Nature of 
the Injury" 
Subsection (c )(2) of section 105 presents the final requirements 
which the taxpayer must satisfy in order to exclude disability benefits 
from gross income. This subsection requires that the payments made 
to the disabled taxpayer must be computed: (1) "with reference to the 
nature of the injury," and (2) "without regard to the period the em­
ployee is absent from work."l31 The purpose of these two require­
ments is to prevent the taxpayer from excluding those payments which 
actually. are compensation for lost wages and not compensation for 
permanent disabilities. Thus, subsection(c)(2) plays an important role 
in properly restricting the use of the exclusion to those who receive 
compensation as a result of a permanent disability. 
The second requirement of section 105(c)(2), that "payments 
must not be computed with regard to the employee's absence from 
work,"132 means that payment of the benefits cannot be conditional 
upon the employee's not returning to work. l33 A plan that pays bene­
131. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982). 
132. Hines, 72 T.C. at 720. 
133. See In re Maller, 53 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) § 84,614, at 84-2497 (1984); 
Christensen v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9254 (D. Minn. 1986); see also Rev. Rul. 
74-603, 1974-2 C.B. 35. In Christensen, the petitioner, who was 50 years old, was forced to 
retire because of total blindness. Under his employer's accident and health plan, he was 
offered a lump-sum payment in lieu of the remaining payments he was to receive until he 
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fits only if the employee stays out of work fails this test because the 
payments are contingent upon the employee's period of absence from 
work. 134 
Section 105(c)(2) also requires that the benefits must vary accord­
ing to the type of injury received. 13s To satisfy this subsection, the 
accident or health plan must use different benefit scales to determine 
the amount of benefits available for differing injuries. 136 
Section 105(c)(2) prohibits the taxpayer from excluding benefits 
which may, in reality, be compensation for lost wages or a payment 
from a profit-sharing plan. Thus, this part of the statute is integral in 
achieving Congress' desire that the taxpayer only be allowed to ex­
clude benefits received because of a permanent disability. ~owever, 
strict judicial and IRS interpretations of this section of the statute 
present some difficulties. 
reached the age of 65. The petitioner accepted the payment. The IRS held that the pay­
ment was not excludible because it was "computed with reference to the period taxpayer 
would be absent from work. Id. at 36. Accord Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,970 (Aug. 29, 1974). 
The IRS stated that th,is case is distinguishable from Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74 
because in Rev. Rul. 63-181 the payment to petitioner was computed with reference to the 
nature of the injury and not with respect to the petitioner'S absence from work as was done 
here. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,970 (Aug. 29, 1974). 
134. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,477 (Aug. 15, 1980). Because one of the provisions of 
petitioner'S plan called for the termination of disability benefits if petitioner returned to 
work, the IRS concluded that the benefiis were computed with regard to employee's ab­
sence from "work and "denied his § \05(c) claim. Id. See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,430,003 
(Mar. 28, 1984). Due to his multiple sclerosis, the petitioner lost the use of his legs and 
received payments under his employer's commercial insurance policy. In ruling that the 
benefits were excludible under § \05(c), the IRS stated that the payments satisfied the re­
quirement of "unrelated to absence from work" because the petitioner continued to work 
while receiving the payments. Id. 
135. The Hines court decided the petitioner's claim on the issue of whether his loss 
met the requirements of § \05(c)(I). Hines v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 715, 719"(1979). See 
supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text. However, in dicta, the court noted that the 
petitioner's plan also failed to satisfy the requirements of § \05(c)(2) because of its failure 
to vary benefits according to the type of injury received (i.e., a pilot who suffers a" heart 
attack and a pilot who loses a limb both collect the same amount of benefits). Id. at 720. 
136. For example, if the plan states that an employee suffering a career~ending heart 
attack receives "X" amount of dollars and an employee who loses a leg receives "Y" 
amount of dollars, the plan satisfies this requirement. The Senate Committee Report of­
fered an example of a hypothetical plan which would satisfy the requirements of § \05(c): 
The following examples will illustrate the kind of payments excludible from gross 
income under [§ \05(c»). Assume that under the plan of an employer payments 
equal to 25 percent of annual compensation are made to employees for loss of a 
leg. The $\0,000 employee would therefore receive a payment of $2,500 and the 
$4,000 employee would receive a payment of $1,000. These amounts would be 
excludible from gross income if, under the plan, they are payable regardless of the 
period that the employee is absent from work. 
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. \05, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4820. "" 
1989] THE DEVELOPMENT AND DIGRESSION OF 26 u.s.c. § l05(c) 201 




A. Beisler v. Commissioner 
While the courts and the IRS generally are justified in interpret­
ing section 105 in a restrictive fashion, they occasionally apply an 
overly-restrictive test and overstep the boundaries which Congress has 
defined. A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Beisler v. Commissioner,137 is such a case. 
In Beisler, the en bane court affirmed the Tax Court and panel 
denial of a section 105 exclusion claim.138 The petitioner Randall 
Beisler played professional football from 1966 to 1975.139 In 1975, 
while playing for the Kansas City Chiefs, Beisler suffered an injury 
that caused him to lose sixty to seventy-nine percent of the use of his 
neck. 14O His doctors advised him to stop playing football and to avoid 
. strenuous labor for the remainder of his life. 141 
The National Football League (NFL) provides for injured players 
through the Bert Bell National Football League Retirement Plan 
(NFL Plan) which compensates players who incur a "substantial dis­
ablement" while playing in an NFL game. 142 Under the NFL Plan, a 
player who incurs a "substantial disablement" may receive, for up to 
sixty months, a monthly "line-of-duty" disability benefit calculated 
with respect to the player's accumulated benefit credits. 143 Following 
the approval of his application for "line-of-duty" disability benefits, 
Beisler received a total of $47,475.00 in payments from the NFL Plan 
137. 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. Beisler v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1985), off'd, 787 F.2d 1325 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
139. Beis/er, 814 F.2d at 1305. 
140. Id.· 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1305-06. A "substantial disablement" is defined by the NFL Plan as a 
permanent disability which: 
(A) Results in a partial bodily disability of 50% or more, or the loss of 50% or 
more of speech or sight; or 50% or more loss of use of the neck or back; or 
(B) Results in 60% or more loss of use of the hearing or an arm, shoulder, leg, 
or hip; or 
(C) Results in 80% or more loss of use of a hand, wrist, elbow, foot, ankle or 
knee; or 
(D) Is the primary or contributory cause of the surgical removal or major func­
tional impairment of a vital bodily organ or part of the central nervous system. 
Id. at 1306 n.1. 
143. [d. at 1305-06. The following table, derived from Article 4.1 of the NFL Plan, 
shows the amount of Benefit Credits accrued by an eligible player for each credited season 
from 1966 to 1975. 
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in 1979, $10,552.00 of which he reported as pension income for that 
year.l44 The Commissioner of the IRS assessed a deficiency in 
Beisler's income tax in 1979 in the amount of $9,291.18 and an addi­
tional tax of $478.06 under section 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 14s Beisler paid the tax and appealed to the Tax Court for a 
refund, alleging that the NFL payments were eligible for exclusion 
under section 105(c). The Tax Court ruled that the entire amount 
constituted income for tax purposes and denied the refund. 146 On ap­
peal, in both its panel and en banc decisions, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court decision and denied Beisler's claim 
for exclusion. 147 
In its en banc decision, the Beisler court acknowledged, but did 
not apply, the standard three-part test which a taxpayer must satisfy 
in order to exclude disability benefits under section 105(c):'48 (1) that 
the amount received was paid through an accident or health insurance 
plan;'49 (2) that the amount "constitute[s] payment for the permanent 
loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body;"'SO and (3) 
that the amount is "computed with reference to the nature of the in­
jury without regard to the period the employee is absent from 
work."ISI Relying on dicta in the earlier Tax Court decision of Hines 
v. Commissioner,'52 the court denied Beisler's exclusion because the 
Credited Season Benefit Credit 
1966 ................................. " .... , ............ $ 65 

1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
1968.................................................... 85 
1969 ..................... " . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..... .. .... ... .. 85 
1970 .. " ................................................ 100 
1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105 
1972 .................................................... 110 
1973 ..................................................... 110 
1974 ....... " ........................................... 110 
1975 .................................................... 110 
Beisier, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536 n.4. 
144. Beisier, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536. 
145. Id. at 535. 
146. Id. at 534. 
147. See Beisler v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on reh'g, 814 
F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). 
148. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1306. 
149. Id. See 26 U.S.c. § 105(a) (1982). 
150. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(1) (1982). 
151. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982). 
152. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). Although the Hines court made its determination based on 
§ 105(c)(I), it did comment on what was necessary to qualify under § 105(c)(2). See Hines, 
72 T.C. at 720-21; see supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text. 
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NFL Plan failed to vary benefits according to the type and severity of 
the injury.lS3 
The court emphasized that only when its expanded "nature of the 
injury" requirement is satisfied do the payments properly reflect an 
exclusively compensatory purpose, and only then may the benefits be 
el{cluded under section 105. 154 Although the NFL Plan contained a 
threshold disability definition that was based on the nature of the in­
jury, ISS it failed the Beisler test, because it computed benefits for eligi­
ble beneficiaries solely on the basis of the number of seasons the player 
had been in the NFL.lS6 Under the NFL Plan, the ten-year veteran 
player who has lost the total use of his leg and the ten-year veteran 
who has lost eighty percent use of his ankle would both receive the 
same amount of benefits, even though one injury is much more severe 
than the other. For this reason, the court held that Beisler could not 
exclude the benefits he received from the NFL Plan. 157 
From a purely textual standpoint, the Beisler court's ruling seems 
persuasive. Section 105(c)(2) explicitly states that the benefits paid 
from an accident or health insurance plan must be computed "with 
reference to the nature of the injury."IS8 When the player satisfies the 
NFL Plan's eligibility requirement, the benefits he receives, in fact, are 
computed with reference to the number of the games he has played 
rather than with reference to the nature of the injury that he has in­
curred. Thus, the NFL Plan fails to comply with the literal meaning 
of section 105(c)(2). 
The Beisler court, however, did not pursue this line of reasoning 
when it denied Beisler's exclusion. The court ignored the legislative 
intent to provide some form of relief to those who are injured perma­
nently,IS9 and added "severity" to the requirement that benefits be 
computed with reference to the nature of the injury. However, a "se­
153. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1307. Because the court decided the issue solely on this 
point, it refused to offer an opinion on whether the NFL Plan satisfied the traditional three­
part test. Id. 
154. Id. at 1308. 
155. See supra note 142. In order to qualify for benefits, the player must experience a 
specified percentage loss or loss of use of the injured area. For instance, a player suffering a 
leg injury must lose at least sixty percent of the leg's use in order to be eligible. Thus, the 
player who loses his leg, a one-hundred percent or total loss, and a player who retains forty 
percent use of his leg are both within the same category. 
156. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1309. 
157. Id. 
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982). 
159. The purpose of the original exclusion statute, § 213(b)(6), a purpose which Con­
gress has retained, was to provide some form of relief to those who suffer from pain associ­
ated with a permanent injury. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
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verity" requirement is not based upon legislative history or statutory 
language, but upon the court's belief that the NFL Plan payments 
were inherently unfair and favored those players who incurred less 
severe injuries. The court did not question the NFL Plan's threshold 
eligibility requirement. It denied the exclusion because, under the 
payment system established by the NFL Plan, a player who becomes a 
quadriplegic as a result of an injury and a player who loses eighty 
percent of the use of his hand could both receive the same amount of 
benefits. Yet, the NFL Plan does not compensate for every single in­
jury that occurs; only those persons with injuries that satisfy the defi­
nition of "substantial disablement" will be compensated. l60 
As stated above, subsection (c)(2) requires, in part, that disability 
payments be "computed with reference to the nature of the injury."161 
In total, subsection (c)(2) is intended to preserve the exclusion only for 
permanent disability benefits. This requirement therefore prevents a 
taxpayer from excluding compensation for lost wages under section 
105(c).162 Prior to Beisler, this requirement was interpreted to mean 
that the payments must vary according to the type of injury re­
ceived,163 an interpretation that was more than adequate in achieving 
Congress' desire that the use of the exclusion privilege be restricted to 
those who suffer permanent disabilities. 
The Beisler court, however, has unnecessarily added a further re­
quirement to this test. According to the court, the payments now 
must be computed with reference to the severity of the injury as well as 
with reference to the nature of the injury. 
The "Beisler test" of severity cannot be justified. l64 The word 
"severity" never is mentioned in the statute,165 the corresponding 
160. See supra note 142. 
161. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982). 
162. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
164. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan stated that the majority's line of rea­
soning would be proper if § 105(c) stated that payments are excludible "if computed only in 
proportion to the severity of the injury and without regard to the number of years of ser­
vice." Beisler, 814 F.2d at 1309 (Noonan, J., dissenting). However, § 105(c)(2) does not 
contain this language. 
In addition to this, Judge Noonan supported his argument with the fact that payments 
from the NFL Plan would be reduced accordingly if workers' compensation payments were 
made to the player. Since workers' compensation statutes normally vary their benefits 
based on the degree of loss of bodily functions, payments under the NFL Plan would vary 
with the nature of the injury. Id. at 1310. Finally, Judge Noonan argued that to tax such 
payments is inconsistent with and contrary to the supporting legislative history. Id. 
165. See supra text accompanying note 48 for the language of § 105(c). 
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Treasury Regulation,166 or the legislative history accompanying sec­
tion 105. 167 It is an addition which is unwarranted in light of the suit­
ability of the test which it modified. The addition of "severity" by the 
Beisler court serves no other purpose than to unduly restrict the exclu­
sion privilege far beyond what Congress intended. 
One way to demonstrate the difficulties with the Beisler approach 
is to ask what more the NFL Plan could have done to satisfy the court 
and the IRS. The Beisler court indicated that a plan must have a 
schedule that tailors benefits to each specific injury.168 Would Beisler 
have been decided differently if the NFL Plan provided a benefit scale 
which stated that a player who loses the total use of his legs and arms 
receives $10,010.00 and a player who loses seventy percent use of his 
neck receives $1O,000.00? According to the Beisler court's reasoning, 
payments under such a benefit scale would qualify for exclusion. 
However, the number of differing disabilities resulting from a contact 
sport like football are far too numerous to "itemize" within a disability 
plan. Instead of cataloging every possible injury that a football player 
could incur, the drafters of the NFL Plan sensibly created four catego­
ries of permanent injuries. In order for the player to be eligible for 
benefits, the player's injury must fall within one of these categories, 
thus satisfying a threshold requirement. In this way, the NFL Plan 
met the section 105(c)(2) requirement that benefits be "computed with 
reference to the nature of the injury."169 
The Beisler court's requirement that the payments be computed 
with reference to the "severity" of the injury is indicative of its displea­
sure with the NFL ~lan only because of the chance that a severely 
injured player could receive less than a player who incurs injuries 
which are less severe. 170 To judge a section 105 claim in such a way 
not only is an injustice to the disabled taxpayer but also is inconsistent 
with Congress' intent when it enacted section 105. Congress does de­
sire to have a restrictive interpretation of section 105. However, 
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1988). 
167. See supra notes 49-50, 56-58 and accompanying text. 
168. Beisler, 814 F.2d at 1308. 
169. The dissent in Beisler argued that the use of the threshold requirement test in 
the NFL Plan satisfied the "computed with reference to the nature of the injury" require­
ment of § 105(c)(2) because it "relates the specific nature of the injuries to the payment of 
benefits." Id. at 1309-10 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
170. For example, a three year veteran player in the NFL who becomes a 
quadriplegic as a result of an injury suffered in an NFL game and a 10 year veteran who 
loses the use of 80% of his left hand would both qualify to receive benefits from the NFL 
Plan. However, under the NFL Plan, the player who lost 80% of the use of his hand would 
receive more disability compensation than the quadriplegic because the 10 year veteran has 
accumulated more benefit credits over the 10 year period. See supra notes 142-43. 
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before Beisler, such an interpretation had been established and served 
that purpose. 
The effect of the Beisler decision is to restrict section lOS's use 
unduly and, as a result, stifle Congress' intent that some form of relief 
be provided to those who suffer because of serious injury or disease. 
Randall Beisler is left with only twenty percent of the use of his neck, 
and all of his benefits are subject to taxation. 
It is the judiciary's duty to interpret and apply the statutes and 
the laws which Congress enacts, but that duty is restricted by the will 
of Congress as expressed in the statute. Thus, it is the Beisler court's 
duty to ensure that the benefits are generated from an accident or 
health plan, that the payment represents compensation for a perma­
nent loss, and that the payment is computed with reference to the na­
ture of the injury. Prior to Beisler, satisfaction of these requirements 
was ensured through application of a series of tests. The Beisler 
court's addition of "severity" does nothing more than question the 
fairness of the payment, an inquiry which undoubtedly is outside the 
judicial prerogative established by Congress when it enacted section 
105 in 1954. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since the enactment of the original statute in 1918, Congress has 
retained the original purpose of the exclusion statute: to offer some 
form of relief to those who must endure the pain and suffering associ­
ated with permanent disabilities. Throughout the years, the statute 
has served that purpose well, but it also has experienced change in the 
wake of an additional congressional desire to preserve and protect this 
privilege. This additional purpose is served by section 105, which 
Congress enacted in 1954. In section 105, Congress included precise 
conditions which disability payments must satisfy before taxpayers can 
exclude such payments from their income. Since the enactment of sec­
tion 105(c), Congress has not altered its language in any way. The 
jUdiciary and the IRS, however, have formulated and applied a series 
of tests, molded from their restrictive interpretation of the statutory 
language and the accompanying legislative history of section 105. The 
judicial creation of tests is not necessarily wrong nor violative of legis­
lative intent. Indeed, some of the tests ensure the proper application 
of section 105, such as the test which the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit created in Caplin v. United States.'7' 
171. 718 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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The Caplin court formulated an analysis which is restrictive and 
therefore protects section 105 from taxpayer abuse, thereby complying 
with the congressional intent of section 105.172 Yet, the "Caplin anal­
ysis" still remains faithful to the purpose underlying the original ex­
clusion statute, section 213(b)(6), to provide relief to those who are 
permanently disabled. 
At other times, the IRS has formulated an approach which is of 
questionable validity but is not directly violative of congressional in­
tent. For example, the approach which the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals endorsed in Hines v. Commissioner 173 is consistent with the 
congressional intent underlying section 105(c). However, there are in­
stances when the application of this approach may deny a legitimate 
claim by a disabled taxpayer because the loss of body function may not 
satisfy the IRS' standards or expectations. Despite these instances, 
both of the preceding approaches essentially are consistent with the 
statutory language and the legislative history of the statute. 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beisler v. Com­
missioner 174 recently formulated a test which undoubtedly violates the 
very foundation section 105 evolved from.175 The Beisler court cre­
ated and applied a test which unnecessarily restricts the use of section 
105, and, as a result, people who are permanently disabled and there­
fore within the class that Congress intended to provide for in 1918 are 
denied the right to exclude their disability benefits from gross income. 
Prior to 1954, judicial and IRS applications of the exclusion stat­
ute, section 22(b)(5), were inconsistent and unpredictable. The IRS 
contradicted themselves numerous times with regard to what qualified 
as insuranceY6 This resulted in an untold amount of confusion and 
uncertainty. In 1954, Congress, out of necessity, intervened in order 
to squelch this uncertainty and confusion. The present pattern of 
quality of interpretation and tests, from good to questionable to bad, 
indicates that Congress should once again intervene and affirmatively 
act. Congress again should remind courts of the original purpose of 
the exclusion statute before they deny more legitimate section 105 
claims. 
Brendan M Fox 
172. For a detailed discussion of the "Caplin analysis," see supra notes 84-101 and 
accompanying text. 
173. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). See supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text. 
174. 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 137-70 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text. 
